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I. INTRODUCTION
T his Article discusses the response of the English judiciary and legis-
lature to the differing expectations and norms of the Muslim commu-
nity living in its midst. Although the emphasis is necessarily on the
English experience, it is hoped that the problems and the reactions will
have echoes on the other side of the Atlantic. England, perhaps more than
the United States, enjoys an ecclesiastical entrenchment in historical
terms. Little of this experience however should be left in the ongoing day
to day reality of the administration of family law. This Article proposes
that pluralism and diversity must be a central theme of modern English
family law, as much perhaps as it is for American family law. The cases
discussed herein will make apparent that this theme is not always the
stated position of English judicial reasoning. One major area in which
expectations and norms of the Muslim community clash with the host
society is the issue of polygamy.
II. POLYGAMY
An English Court of Appeal decision, Hussain v. Hussain,1 arose out of
a petition by the wife for a decree ofjudicial separation. The marriage was
solemnized in Pakistan according to the Muslim law of that country. The
* M.A., L.L.M., Ph.D., University of Cambridge.
1 [1982] 3 All E.R. 369.
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husband, of Pakistani origin, had acquired a domicile of choice in Eng-
land: the wife, at the time of the marriage, was domiciled in Pakistan.
Referring the court to section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973,
the husband answered the wife's separation petition by challenging the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition because, he alleged, the
marriage was void from its inception. The Act states:
A marriage celebrated after 31st July 1971 shall be void on the
following grounds only, that is to say . . . (d) in the case of a
polygamous marriage entered into outside England and Wales,
that either party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in
England and Wales.
For the purposes of paragraph (d) of this subsection a marriage
may be polygamous although at its inception neither party has
any spouse additional to the other.2
Believing that this section of the Act codified the common law rule,3
academics and lawyers have perceived section 11(d) as preventing an Eng-
lish domicilary from contracting a potentially or actually polygamous
marriage. Ormrod, L.J. speaking on behalf of the court in Hussain, has
taken a different view of the law by accepting the argument submitted by
the wife's counsel. Questioning the legislature's bias against polygamy,
Orrnrod, L.J. stated: "[I]t is difficult to conceive any reason why Parlia-
ment, in an increasingly pluralistic society, should have thought it neces-
sary to prohibit persons whose religious or cultural traditions accept
polygamy from marrying in their own manner abroad simply because
they are domiciled in England and Wales. ' '4
Ormrod, L.J. proceeded to contend that a marriage is not caught by
section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act if it is not actually polyg-
amous at its inception, and is incapable of actually becoming polygamous
by virtue of the personal laws of the parties at the time it was entered
into.
On the facts of Hussain, the husband was incapable of contracting a
valid marriage while already married.5 The wife, who was domiciled in
Pakistan at the time of the marriage, could not marry another man while
married to her husband under the laws of Pakistan. Thus, the marriage
2 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 11.
3 See R(G)3/75 (an insurance case); Zahra v. Islamabad, [1979-801 Imm.A.R. 48; Morris
v. Morris, (unreported) 22 April 1980 (cited in Bradley, Duress and Arranged Marriages, 46
MOD. L. REv. 499, 503 (1983); Nabi v. Heaton, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1052. See also The Law
Commission and Scottish Law Commission Working Paper, Polygamous Marriages (PWP.,
No. 83)(1982), cited in Bradley, supra, at 503; and the Scottish Law Commission C.M. 56
(1982)[hereinafter cited as W.P. 83 and C.M. 56].
4 Ormrod, L.J., giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Hussain, 3 All E. R. at
372.
5 See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 11(b). The Act states: "A marriage...
shall be void ... (b) that at the time of the marraige either party was already lawfully
married ......
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was not polygamous at its inception and was valid under English law. The
petition of the wife was restored to the list for a pronouncement of a
decree of judicial separation.
Hussain is cited in the context of this paper because it is clear that the
court was heavily influenced by public policy considerations. The judge
stated at the end of his opinion that the consequences of adopting the
argument advanced by the husband would have "widespread and pro-
found" repercussions on the Muslim community in England.6
What is the policy consideration explicit from this judgment? Of para-
mount importance is the significance of domicile; respect for Muslim law
or Muslim cultural values plays a smaller role. If the marriage actually
had been polygamous, it would have been held void; likewise, if the wife
had been domiciled in England and the husband domiciled in Pakistan,
again the marriage would have been void. The Law Commissions have
pointed out that the practical effect of the Court of Appeal decision in
Hussain has been to interpret English legislation in such a manner that
certain marriages contracted outside England are void when the woman
is domiciled in England, whereas the very same marriage is treated as
valid when it is the man who is domiciled in England. The policy factor
underlying the decision was to "preserve the principle of monogamy for
persons domiciled in [England]."7 The practical effect is to produce a
discriminatory situation. In any event, it may be queried: Why the con-
cern for preserving this principle?
The Law Commissions have recommended repealing the potentially
polygamous marriage concept. They believe, however, that the law should
continue to prohibit English domiciliaries from contracting actually po-
lygamous marriages. Even polygamous marriages that are valid because
the persons concerned were domiciled in a country such as Pakistan,
where marriages of this type are permissible, are given only restricted
recognition. A clear example of this is evident upon studying the impact
of polygamous marriages on social security benefits.
Consider the hypothetical case of a Pakistani national and domiciliary
who many years ago married a woman in that country under Muslim law.
Subsequently he married a second wife. This second marriage is actually
polygamous. The husband did not divorce his first wife because of the
social and cultural inhibitions which prevented him from doing so. He
later emigrated to the United Kingdom where he took up employment,
paying compulsory national insurance contributions.
Upon the husband's death, neither wife is entitled to claim the state
widow's pension. This may be justified if both spouses remained in
Pakistan, but why should the position be the same if the husband came to
the United Kingdom with his second wife who lived with him as his sole
wife? What possible policy factor prevents the payment of a widow's bene-
6 Hussain, 3 All E.R. at 372.
7 Id.
1985-86]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
fit to this person? Although the husband has paid the compulsory contri-
butions and the first wife is living and has always lived out of the United
Kingdom, the second wife's status cannot be remedied since the regula-
tions insist on marriages which are monogamous.8
While issues involving polygamy may arise only rarely in the United
Kingdom, such issues appear to have occupied the time of the Law Com-
missions on a number of occasions.9 Nevertheless, polygamous marriages
raise issues that illustrate the strains inherent in policy. Marriages con-
tracted in Muslim form are potentially polygamous, and only a few Mus-
lim countries have gone so far as to prohibit polygamous marriages. As
Ormrod, L.J. claimed in Hussain, the court is anxious to uphold the mo-
nogamous nature of a marriage for those who are domiciled in England. 10
The primary basis for court concern regarding polygamous marriages
is the protection of the weaker members of the family unit. If such mem-
bers require no such protection, as in the social security example, then it
is unnecessary to uphold the traditions of monogamy. It may be queried
whether this position toward polygamy is evidence that the Christian
ethic still prevails and is enforced even over those who do not follow it."
III. QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
Of similar importance to the Muslim community living in the United
Kingdom are the following issues: the position accorded to arranged mar-
riages; the law on divorce; the enforcement of the dower and other aspects
of the Muslim marriage contract; registration arrangements; alimony;
the custody of children; and the succession rights of the Muslim heirs.
These problems present themselves in many areas of interaction with the
host community: social security, taxation, matrimonial rights, probate,
immigration law, and employment law.
In England, a large body of case law has emerged which is concerned
with the interaction of Muslim family law with the English legal system.
A number of official bodies, including the Law Commission, have exam-
ined other areas in which Islam has impacted English law and its admin-
istration. Members of Parliament have occasionally addressed such
concerns in response to communications with constituents detailing par-
ticular areas of difficulty.
8 Social Security and Family Allowances (Polygamous Marriages) Regulations 1975,
S.I. 1975, no. 561.
9 Most recently, issues involving polygamy have been addressed by the Law Commis-
sions in 1982 in W.P. 83 and C.M.56.
10 See supra text accompanying note 7.
J. RoBILIARD, RELIGION AND THE LAW 190 (1984).
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IV. BARS TO REMARRIAGE
For some time, a number of members of Parliament have been collect-
ing evidence of abuse by some Muslim husbands who, after an English
divorce, refuse to divorce their wives by talaq. The wives in this position
believe that they have not been properly divorced in accordance with their
religion, and remarriage within the community is clearly difficult. The
wives are vulnerable to blackmail by their husbands. In the debate on
this problem in the House of Commons, the Minister of Parliment for one
constituency in the North West of England referred to five incidents in his
caseload by way of illustration. 2 In one case, the ex-husband demanded
£5000 and the return of the wedding jewelry. In a second case, the man
agreed to a religious divorce, only if he did not have to pay maintenance
and the wedding jewelry was returned. 13 Mr. Leo Abse, a Minister of
Parliment, proposed the insertion of a new clause in the Matrimonial and
Family Proceedings Bill of 1984 while it was proceeding through the
parliamentary stages. The clause read as follows:
Where a petition for divorce has been presented to the court,
either party to the marriage may apply to the court at any time
before decree absolute opposing the grant of the decree absolute
on the ground that there exists a barrier to the religious remar-
riage of the applicant which is in the power of the other applicant
to remove. 1
4
A further clause gives the court power to g.7ant a decree absolute when
exceptional circumstances make it desirable for the decree to be made
without delay.
These clauses were modeled on a New York domestic relations statute
that is substantially more forthright in its approach, stating:
Any party to a marriage ... who commences a proceeding to
annul the marriage or for a divorce must allege, in his or her
verified complaint: (i) that, to the best of his or her knowledge,
that, he or she has taken or that he or she will take, prior to the
entry of final judgment, all steps solely within his or her power to
remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the
annulment or divorce .... 15
12 1314 Hansard 925, 13 June 1984. An elaboration of this issue by this author is avail-
able in Pearl, Recognition of the Talaq: A Postscript, 43 CAMBIUDGE L.J. 248 (1984).
13 Similar stories have arisen within the Jewish community where men refuse to go
through a religious divorce (the ghett) which is solely within their power, thereby depriving
a former wife of the opportunity of remarrying in a traditional synagogue. See Brett v. Brett,
[1969] 1 All ER. 1007.
14 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Bill, 1984. The bill is now the Matrimonial and
Family Proceedings Act, 1984.
15 N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 253 (Consol. 1984).
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In England, the clause was withdrawn upon assurances by the govern-
ment legal officer that it would consider the matter seriously if it were
raised again. At the present time, the government is opposed to such an
amendment primarily because of its views that the amendment would be
wrong to prevent a marriage from being dissolved by a bar that is based
on one rather narrow aspect of conduct, at a time when bars to divorce
have been readily abandoned. The policy questions which arise in this
context illustrate the balance which must be obtained between accom-
modating the particular difficulties of the Muslim community within the
broader framework of a secular and uniform legal system. Necessarily,
the Muslim community leaders have not been particularly forceful in
supporting the change suggested by the parliamentarians. 16
V. ARRANGED MARRIAGES
The English legal system is also vexed by the problems associated with
arranged marriages, common under Islamic custom. A recent English
case, Hirani v. Hirani,"1 illustrates the issues that may arise. In this case,
the judge of the Family Division of the High Court was presented with an
undefended petition by the wife for a decree of nullity on the ground that
she had entered into the marriage under duress exerted by her parents.
The judge dismissed the petition and the wife appealed to the Court of
Appeal. The facts of this case state that the wife was nineteen years old
and living with her Hindu parents in England when she struck up a
relationship with a young Indian Muslim, a Mr. Hussain. When the par-
ents discovered this liaison they made immediate arrangements for her to
marry a Mr. Hirani, a Hindu. Neither the woman nor her parents had
ever seen this man, however, the parents pressured her to go through with
a ceremony of marriage at a register office. The judge recalled the pres-
sure the parents exerted upon their daughter to marry Mr. Hirani:
You want to marry somebody who is strictly against our religion;
he is a Muslim, you are a Hindu; you had better marry somebody
we want you to, otherwise pack up your belongings and go. If you
do not want to marry Mr. Hirani and you want to marry Mr.
Hussain, go.'
The woman went through a civil marriage ceremony, and subsequently
participated in a religious ceremony. 9 After the religious ceremony, she
16 The Board of Deputies of British Jews had lobbied for the introduction of an amend-
ment, slightly narrower in its scope than the clause which was debated.
17 (1983), 4 F.L.R. 232 (C.A.).
Is Id. at 233.
19 Most Hindu, and indeed Muslim, marriages in England involve the participants in
two ceremonies. The first ceremony takes place in civil form in a register office. The second
purely religious ceremony takes place in the mosque or temple. By English law, the parties
are man and wife after the ceremony in the register office. Invariably they will not com-
118 [Vol. 34:113
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lived with Mr. Hirani for six weeks. She then left him, and went to Mr.
Husain's house claiming to never have consummated the marriage with
Mr. Hirani. She never went back to her husband's house. The trial judge
was not without sympathy for the woman, yet he felt constrained to refuse
the decree. He referred to the test which has been adopted in England by
the appellate court in Szechter v. Szechter:
[Has] the will of one of the parties thereto been overborne by
genuine and reasonably held fear by the threat of immediate dan-
ger (for which the party is not himself responsible) to life, limb or
liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to
ordinary wedlock[?] 20
The trial judge argued that it was essential to find evidence of threats to
life, limb, or liberty. He found no such evidence in this case, and he
therefore refused the petition. The Court of Appeal in Hirani reached a
different conclusion, and granted the decree which was asked. In doing so,
the court appears to have abandoned the objective standard of fear as the
appropriate test and returned to the subjective approach adopted in the
cases in the nineteenth century. Ormrod, L.J. stated:
The crucial question in these cases ... is whether the threats,
pressure or whatever it is, is such as to destroy the reality of
consent and overbears the will of the individual. It seems to me
that this case ... is a classic case of a young girl, wholly depen-
dant on her parents, being forced into a marriage with a man she
has never seen in order to prevent her (reasonably from her par-
ent's point of view) continuing in an association with a Muslim
mence living together as man and wife until the second ceremony is performed. This double
procedure is necessary because very few mosques or temples are registered for the purposes
of the solemnization of marriages under the Marriage Act, 12 & 14 Geo. 6 ch. 76, § 41 (1949).
Mosques are normally not registered, in part because of problems relating to the marriage of
foreign domiciled Muslims in an actually polygamous ceremony, and also because few mos-
ques comply with the statutory requirement that they must be separate buildings.
20 Hirani (1983), 4 F.L.R. at 234 citing Szechter v. Szechter, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 170, 180. In
an earlier case involving the Sikh community, Singh v. Singh (1971), P. 226, counsel repre-
senting the wife had argued unsuccessfully that this test was too narrow. Her counsel had
suggested that such a test "would impose artificial limitations in the law of nullity on the
principle that the lack of consent makes a marriage void." In Singh v. Singh, the parties had
not met before the marriage, and the wife's counsel had attempted to argue that "religious
fear vitiated the marriage on the ground of duress." Id. at 229. The wife's counsel said: "It
would be unrealistic of the law to say that if she married him when her father pointed a gun
behind her back the marriage was void because her will was overborne by fear, but if she
married him when her father stood behind her without holding a gun the marriage was
valid, even though she was only going through the ceremony out of obedience to her father
and because of his express wish and she had been brought up in a society where her father's
wish had the force of law." Id. at 228. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: "A sense
of duty to her parents and the feeling of obligation to adhere to the custom of religion there
may be, but of fear not a shred of a suggestion. Reluctance no doubt; but not fear." Id. at 233.
1985-86]
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which they would regard with abhorence. But it is as clear a case
as one could want of the overbearing of the will of the petitioner
and thus invalidating or vitiating her consent. 21
Arranged marriages, as has already been suggested, involve just one
admittedly important aspect-the problem of reconciling different cul-
tural values within the framework of a secular and general law. Some
would argue that no reason exists that requires the accommodation of
these differing patterns and values. David Bradley, a Lecturer in Law at
the London School of Economics, has maintained:
The diverse and sometimes conflicting interests involved in the
arranged marriage system include those of the second and subse-
quent generations exposed to two cultures, the immediate family
including siblings, the wider kinship network and the ethnic
group as a whole. Inevitably these cannot all be accommodated in
a family law in which the prevailing ethic is individualism.22
Bradley suggests that the onus should be on those "with dual culture
affiliations" to determine which system they wish to adopt in relation to
marriage.23 This formulation presents some difficulty: Can the parties be
allowed to opt for British or American individualism instead of Islamic
community mores? If so, what is the position when one person makes such
an election and the partner does not do so? In any event, such an election
is hardly likely to be freely made in either direction.
Peer pressure can often be very strong among the Asian youth, and may
be as strong as the pressure from home. Once an individual has chosen to
adhere to a particular marriage system, the courts are reluctant to inter-
fere. It will certainly be difficult, if not impossible, for a man having made
a choice to acquiesce in the cultural expectations of the community to
later pray for relief in the spirit of individualism so as to obtain a decree of
nullity on the grounds of duress.24 One must ask whether this is a matter
of cultural insensitivity or simply an acknowledgement that, having
elected to fulfil the family expectations, the man cannot ex post facto rely
on the differing expectations of the host community.
Thus, it is not a question of the wife in Hirani opting for anything. She
simply had no choice. If an absence of choice is present, as there is in some
cases, then the marriage will be set aside. The question is really not what
choice did she make, but rather whether she had a choice or not.
21 Hirani (1983), 4 F.L.R. at 234. For a comment on this case see Bradley, supra note 3.
2 Bradley, supra note 3, at 504.
23 Id.
24 See the Court of Appeal decision in Singh v. Kaur (1981), 11 Fain. 151, 152(A Sikh case)
cited in Bradley, supra note 21, at 501.
[Vol. 34:113
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Individualism is paramount. 25 Individualism, however, does not exclude
individualized expectations, and public policy in England will respect and
give effect to arrangements whereby a marriage solemnized in a register
office will not be consummated prior to a subsequent religious ceremony.
Thus, the party who prevents the second ceremony from taking place will
be preventing the marriage from being consummated. That party will not
be able to petition for a decree of nullity based on willful refusal to
consummate the marriage because the other person has a valid defense.
Furthermore, that person himself or herself will be guilty-of willful re-
fusal to consummate the marriage and a successful petition can be
brought against him or her. Additionally, English courts have been will-
ing to imply agreements of this nature from the surrounding circum-
stances of the register office marriage.26
VI. DIVORCE
The Muslim law of divorce presents most of the problems that have
arisen; a brief description of the Muslim law institution of talaq is
useful. 27 In the classical form, the talaq is the manner by which a man
divorces his wife. It is unilateral and is not subject to inquiry by any
outside person or committee. In certain circumstances if pronounced in a
triple form, the talaq dissolves the marriage immediately on pronounce-
ment. This form of talaq is often referred to by English judges as a "bare
talaq." The talaq of this type is not enjoined in Islam, and is not available
to the Shi'i Muslim community. One judge in pre-independence India,
referring to the classical form of talaq followed by the majority Sunni
community, called such an institution good in law although bad in the-
ology. Restrictions have been placed on the power of the husband in many
Muslim countries primarily to provide an opportunity for
reconsideration.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh (although not in India), a 1961 ordinance
makes it obligatory for the husband to inform both his wife and a local
official of the pronouncement of the talaq. This official is placed under
certain duties to attempt a reconciliation and the divorce is not effective
until ninety days after he has been notified.
The United Kingdom has in recent years reacted to the large number of
Muslims living in the country by enacting legislation which purports to
lay down certain guidelines for the recognition of divorces of this kind.
2 See Khusai ja Bi (1968)(unreported) discussed in Pearl, Immigrant Marriages: Some
Legal Problems, 2 NEW COMMUNrrY 67, 72 (1972), cited in Bradley, supra note 3, at 500 n.
11. In this case, a decree was granted to a Muslim girl who was married by her two brothers
who placed an advertisement in the Urdu press in the United Kingdom.
2 See Kaur v. Singh, [1972] All E.R. 292; Singh v. Kaur (1979),7 NEw COMMUNITY 275.
27 This discussion is transcribed from a previous article by this writer. See Pearl, supra
note 12.
1985-86]
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The legislation is a little unclear and has been the subject of considerable
case law. Of paramount importance is section 8 of the Recognition of
Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971 (1971 Act). This law
enables a court to withhold recognition of an otherwise effective foreign
divorce when its recognition would be manifestly contrary to public
policy.
An example of the operation of section 8 of the 1971 Act is the case of
Zaal v. Zaal.28 The facts in Zaal reveal that an English women married
her husband, a Dubai national, in 1975 in Dubai under Muslim law. A
child was born shortly afterwards. The family lived in Dubai but visited
England regularly. In June 1978, while the wife was in England, the
husband divorced his wife by talaq in Dubai. The talaq was of the "bare
talaq" variety. The wife then petitioned for a divorce in the English
courts. In his answer to her divorce petition the husband relied on the
talaq divorce and sought a declaration that this talaq be recognized as
dissolving the marriage. Bush, J. explained the policy issue before the
court:
Here was a young woman who entered into a marriage governed
by Islamic religious laws and customs and who clearly knew of
the dangers which might arise as a result of the ease with which a
talaq could be pronounced. Further, it was her intention to live
with her husband for the majority of their time together in a
Muslim society.2 9
Notwithstanding this submission on behalf of the husband, the court
rejected the argument and exercised its discretion to refuse recognition
under section 8 of the 1971 Act.
[I]t would manifestly be contrary to public policy to recognize the
divorce. I have come to this conclusion on the restricted ground
that what was done, though properly done according to the hus-
band's own customary laws, was done in secrecy so far as the wife
was concerned. The first this wife knew of it the deed was done
and she was divorced in fact and in law and it was irrevocable and
binding according to the law of the husband's state. No oppor-
tunity was given to enlist the aid of her's or the husband's rela-
tives in repairing the breach. Common justice requires that some
notice other than a casual threat ought to be given for so solemn a
proceeding. It is this that in this case offends one's sense ofjustice
and jars upon the conscience .... 30
- (1983), 4 F.L.R. 284.
2 Id. at 289.
3D Id.
[Vol. 34:113
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Courts in England have been wary of exercising their discretion to
refuse recognition under section 8 of the Act. Wood, J. conveyed this
reluctance in his opinion in Quazi v. Quazi:
[I]t is important that the courts in this jurisdiction should appre-
ciate that we have living in our community persons who have a
religion different from those with which we are familiar and with
its particular devout customs, obligations and rights. I see noth-
ing contrary to public policy in the recognition of... the talaq.
31
In Zaal, where the petitioner was English (in contrast to Quazi where
both parties were Pakistani), it may well have been correct for the judge to
refuse recognition on public policy grounds. Bush, J.'s statement, however,
is probably expressed too broadly In a different context, Wood, J. has
argued consistently that the "bare talaq" (as opposed to, for instance, the
Pakistan talaq) should only be recognized in the United Kingdom when it
is obtained abroad and is valid by the domiciliary laws of the parties. It
should not be recognized simply because it is obtained in the country of
nationality or habitual residence of either party.32 This view has now been
followed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Chaudhary v. Chaudhary,33
where Oliver, J. said:
In my judgment it must plainly be contrary to the policy of the
law in a case where both parties to a marriage are domiciled in
this country to permit one of them, while continuing his English
domicile, to avoid the incidents of his domiciliary law and to de-
prive the other party to the marriage of her rights under that law
by the simple process of taking advantage of his financial ability
to travel to a country whose laws appear temporarily to be more
favourable to him.3
This view proposes that distinctions between different forms of the talaq
cannot really be drawn and justified due to the limited nature of reforms,
in Pakistan, for instance.
A final matter in connection with the talaq which requires some com-
31 Quazi v. Quazi, [1980] A.C. 744, 782.
32 The Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, ch. 53, §§ 2 -5.
The domiciliary connecting factor is retained by virtue of the Domicile and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act, 1973, ch. 45, § 6. See Quazi v. Quazi, [1979] 3 All E. R. 897 (at first
instance); Sharif v. Sharif (1980), 10 Fam. 216; Chaudhary v. Chaudhary (1983), 13 Fain. 177.
3 [1984] 3 All E.R. 1017.
Id. at 1033. This statement must now be read in the light of the new provisions in
section 12 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which enable the court to
grant financial relief (maintenance, lump sum provision, transfer of property orders, etc.)
when granting a decree and also when recognizing a foreign decree. On the other hand, if
the foreign decree will not be recognized if it is a "bare talaq" (because it is not a 'Judicial or
other proceedings" within the meaning of the Act) then distinctions will still have to be
drawn between the Pakistani talaq and the talaq for instance in Dubai.
1985-86]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ment relates to a talaq pronounced in the United Kingdom where stat-
utory provisions prohibit recognition. The Domicile and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act, 1973 states: "No proceeding in the United Kingdom...
shall be regarded as validly dissolving a marriage unless instituted in the
courts of law of one of those countries. '35
Notwithstanding the common law rules which have survived in section
6 of the 1971 Act which are based on domicile, section 16(2) requires that a
nonjudicial divorce obtained abroad "shall not be regarded as validly
dissolving a marriage if both parties to the marriage have throughout the
period of one year immediately preceding the institution of the proceed-
ing been habitually resident in the United Kingdom."36 A divorce ob-
tained in the country of habitual residence of either party is recognized as
the exception to this provision under sections 2 through 5 of the 1971 Act.
Section 16(2) of the Act clarifies a policy position which confines recogni-
tion of the talaq to those cases where the nexus of the parties is outside of
the United Kingdom.
VII. AMERICAN CASES
Similar problems to those arising in the United Kingdom occur from
time to time in the United States. In Shikoh v. Murff,3 7 the Pakistani
husband, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain residence entitlement,
purported to divorce his Pakistani wife and marry an American national.
The judgment recalls that he visited the spiritual head and national
director of the Islamic Mission of America, Inc. for the propagation of
Islam in Brooklyn, New York. The husband signed a document which
declared that his marriage had been dissolved. The national director of
this organization then appended to this document a declaration to the
effect that by the authority vested in him in accordance with the laws of
Islam and in conformity of the laws of the government of the United
States of America, the husband and his wife were hereby divorced. The
document was sent to the Consulate General of Pakistan in New York,
and a copy was sent to the wife.
In proceedings arising out of the subsequent second marriage of the
husband, and the unsuccessful application to adjust his status to that of
permanent resident, the New York court refused to recognize the decree.
The decision was based to a large extent on New York's state constitution
which provides that a divorce shall not be granted "otherwise than by due
3 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 11.
16 For further information on this complicated subject, and in particular for a discussion
of the so-called transnational talaq, see Pearl, Recognition of the Talaq; Some Recent Cases,
43 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 49 (1984); Pearl, supra note 12, commenting on R. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Fatima; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Bi [1984] 2 All E.R. 458.
37 257 F2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
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judicial proceedings. '38 The court undoubtedly believed that the actions of
the husband before the national director of the Islamic Mission failed to
constitute judicial proceedings. The divorce was rendered invalid.
A more recent case which dealt with a Pakistani divorce subsequent to
the amendments introduced by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961
is Chaudry v. Chaudry" heard before the Superior Court of New Jersey
(Appellate Division) in 1978. Both parties in this case were Muslim cit-
izens of Pakistan. The husband pronounced the talaq in New Jersey and
filed the talaq with his consulate in New York. The consul informed the
wife and forwarded a notice of the talaq to a district judge in Karachi. At
this time, the official had the powers to summon an arbitration council
under the provisions of the 1961 Ordinance to attempt reconciliation. The
wife challenged the validity of the talaq in the Pakistani courts by way of
a constitutional petition. The challenge was heard by two high court
judges in Karachi and was dismissed.40 Given those circumstances, the
New Jersey court stated that the "principles of comity require that the
divorce be recognized here. '41 The trial judge had relied on Shikoh v.
Murff; the appellate court felt that this reliance was misplaced and pro-
ceeded to distinguish Shikoh:
Unlike the facts in that case, here there was more than the mere
declaration of divorce- talaq-before the Pakistan consulate in
New York City. The divorce was actually confirmed by a court in
Pakistan after being contested by the wife .... Under these cir-
cumstances, principles of comity require that the divorce be rec-
ognized here.42
The public policy of the state was not offended: the court emphasized
that "predictability and stability in status relationships" was of funda-
mental importance. 43 An analysis of these two cases serves to emphasize
that the talaq is not contrary to public policy. United Kingdom legislation
follows a similar pattern. Indeed, policy requirements which support the
recognition of the talaq include comity, stability, and predictability. How-
ever, the "bare talaq" is likely to be refused recognition unless there is a
clear nexus between the parties concerned and the country where the
talaq is pronounced. A "bare talaq" pronounced in the United States or in
the United Kingdom is unlikely to be afforded recognition, primarily
because of the absence of this nexus.
3 N.Y. CONST. art. I., § 9.
39 159 N.J. Super. 566, 388 A.2d 1000 (1978).
40 Reported in 1976 PLD Karachi 416 as Mrs. Parveen Chaudry v. Vith Senior Civil
Judge, Karachi. See Chaudry, 159 N.J. Super. at 575, 388 A.2d at 1004-05.
41 Chaudry, 159 N.J. Super. at 576, 388 A.2d at 1005.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The judicial response to identified tensions resulting from cultural dif-
ferences between Islamic and Anglo-American family law policies have
been examined herein. Undoubtedly, in the United Kingdom considerable
thought has been given by Muslim community leaders to the possibility of
pressing for the introduction of the Shari'a law for Muslim observants. So
far, such pressures have been resisted. Nevertheless, some bodies, i.e., the
Churches' Committee on Migrant Workers in Europe (CCMWE)(Working
Group on Islam), have been seriously examining the proposal in the con-
text of a European initiative. Such proposals are based very largely on
pluralism in cultural identity and the feeling that this phenomenon
should be reflected in the legal system, especially in matters relating to
the family laws.
In an unpublished 1984 work, the Working Group on Islam of the
CCMWE refers to a number of strategems. One consideration suggested
is the development of Shari'a courts. In the United Kingdom, precedents
amongst the Jewish and the Catholic communities exist. Such religious
courts could pass judgments in the family law area through which the
contractual aspect of the submission to the jurisdiction would be binding
on the parties. It would not release the parties from the obligation of
obtaining the necessary secular change of status from the secular court.
There would be circumstances when the Shari'a court decision would play
no part in a secular decision: no custody court making a decision in the
best interests of the child would follow a Shari'a court decision to award
custody to the father in accordance with Islamic law precedent; no secular
court deciding on alimony would pay any regard to a Shari'a court deter-
mination that alimony ends within a short time after the divorce has
become irrevocable. Inheritance also would cause problems, and the secu-
lar probate court would pay regard to the domiciliary law rather than to
the religious law. Thus, an intestate deceased's estate would be dis-
tributed according to the domiciliary law (as regards the movables) and
the situs (as regards the immovables), regardless of the Muslim law; no
adjudication from a Muslim judge could really change this position.
This Article has addressed a number of matters in which a conflict is
present between the particular rule of Islamic law and the uniform law. In
the final analysis, the courts from time to time have not been particularly
sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the ethnic community. Nonethe-
less, public policy tends to operate from a "bottom line" perspective that
can best be described as "offensive to the conscience." 44
Case law appears to suggest that the conscience is more offended when
the parties are domiciled within the United Kingdom (or perhaps also
44 Compare Cheni v. Cheni, [1965] P. 85 with Viswalingham v. Viswalingham, (1979), 1
F.L.R. 15.
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United States) than when the domiciliary connection is elsewhere. The
conscience is equally offended when the particular institution which is
being pleaded appears to deny the other member of the unit an equal
protection. Beyond this, one must hope that British and American judges
and legislators would respect and be sensitive to the laws and customs
accepted by many peoples of"deep religious conviction, lofty ethical stan-
dards and high civilisation. ' '45
4 Opinion of Sir Jocelyn Simon P. in Cheni v. Cheni, 119651 P at 99. The parties con-
cerned in Cheni were Sephardic Jews from Egypt, but the terminology used by Judge Simon
P. can be equally applicable for the Muslim community.
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